Recognizing opportunities to achieve pending goals is an important cognitive ability. But when and how do we recognize that a current situation is especially suited to resuming a past goal? The predictive encoding model suggests pending goals are stored in memory as associations with environmental features. Optimally, these features are (1) predicted to be necessary for successful goal satisfaction; (2) derived by advance planning when deciding to postpone the goal; and (3) described so as to be readily identified in the environment. Later, ordinary perception of features in the environment leads to automatic recognition of opportunities already prepared in memory. Evidence from experimental studies support this theory, and demonstrate that general preparation can produce apparently novel opportunism. These findings suggest ways to facilitate the recognition of opportunities to satisfy pending goals.
RECOGNIZING OPPORTUNITIES
In a dynamic world, we are sometimes forced to postpone pursuit of our goals. For some goals, a plan can be created, but a needed resource (e.g., time, location, and tools) may be currently unavailable. Because many goals are pursued simultaneously in everyday life, such intentions to return to pending goals are frequently generated. At the same time, we are continually confronted with rich environments containing potential connections to our goals. What determines whether we recognize an opportunity to satisfy a pending goal?
This problem of "opportunism" would seem to require elaborate reasoning: How else can you identify one of many pending goals that is particularly relevant in the current environment? For example, suppose you have recently moved to a new home, and need to change your address at the motor vehicle bureau. You make a mental note of your intention to go to the bureau office and fill out the required forms. But when, if ever, will you return to this pending goal? You may fail to do so, or you may adopt a strategy like creating an external reminder (a note on your calendar) (c.f. Ceci & Bronfenbrenner, 1985) . Or, days later, you may drive downtown for a scheduled lunch appointment. Once there, you find it has been unexpectedly cancelled, and you have some free time before your next appointment. Will you recognize this circumstance as a good time to pursue your "address change" goal? The ability to notice this event as an opportunity, and to shift your planning strategies accordingly, may be considered a hallmark of intelligent goal pursuit (Schank & Abelson, 1976) .
MODELS OF OPPORTUNISM
Ideally, one would recall a goal from memory whenever the needed resources become available, and not otherwise. However, this creates a heavy processing load where each new cue is compared to all pending goals in memory. To accomplish this, an early computational model of opportunism in planning (Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth, 1979) posited specialized goal "agents." These multiple agents are posited to operate in parallel, and independently of central executive processes. These agents watch for and "notice" conditions relevant to them, and then jump in to interrupt current processing to satisfy their goal. Based on their specific expertise (about conditions for specific plans, or how to cluster goals), distributed agents are able to recognize novel circumstances as relevant to their individual goal. Birnbaum and Collins (1984) argued that goals must have this independent capacity to monitor information about their relevance. For example, suppose you are both hungry and thirsty, and you decide to go out to a restaurant. If you pass a water fountain along the way, you will likely recognize it as an opportunity to satisfy your thirst ahead of schedule. This suggests some process must constantly reason about the relevance of new information (the water fountain), and then insert its goal into current actions (stop for a drink). In fact, Freud (1938) suggests this same account to explain "slips of the tongue," where unexpressed goals interrupt and insert themselves into planned speech acts (as when an unmarried acquaintance asked, "How long have you been buried?" when he meant to say, "married"). However, because processing resources are committed to each pending goal, this "goals as agents" account also (implausibly) suggests that no opportunities will ever be missed.
A simpler alternative handles the problem of connecting later cues to goals in memory by moving it back to the time of encoding. Once a pending goal has been associated with a specific cue, the later presence of the cue in the environment should automatically bring the goal to mind. In "event-based" retrieval, external cues are thought to activate links to pending goals in memory (Brandimonte & Passolunghi, 1994) . For example, you may be reminded of the "address change" goal when you happen to drive by the motor vehicle bureau, or when a family member mentions their own need to register. More specific cues have been found to work better than more general ones; for example, it's easier to remember to perform a future task if told to do it after finishing "the Black Panthers question" than after "the last survey question" (Loftus, 1971) . McDaniel, Robinson-Riegler, & Einstein (1998) have shown that perceiving a cue as related to the goal may depend upon the current context. In these studies, cues were assigned to goals at random (e.g., "perform action X when you see cue Y"). However, in more naturalistic tasks, opportunism may require identifying the presence of novel cues related to successful goal pursuit.
PREDICTIVE ENCODING OF PENDING GOALS
Our own model further develops this event-based retrieval account to suggest how the types of features considered during encoding determine success in recognizing later opportunities (Seifert, Hammond, Johnson, Converse, MacDougal, & VanderStoep, 1994) . In our account, the same planning processes that first recommend postponing further pursuit of the goal also predict which features may help to satisfy the goal. First, a plan is created, and special resources, tools, locations, agents, skills, or times required are identified. For example, the "address change" goal requires being downtown at the bureau office, having several hours free, having your current license along, and being there during office hours. Once these features have been "prepared" in memory together with the pending goal, you are ready to notice related opportunities based on external cues in the environment. This predictive encoding process involves the following steps:
(1) Goals that cannot be fit into current activity are postponed.
(2) The planner reasons about the circumstances required for its satisfaction.
(3) Postponed goals are then encoded into memory in association with these features. (3) During other activities, the predicted features may be perceived in the environment. (4) When perceived, the goals associated with them are also brought to mind.
(5) The planner can then reason about whether to resume pursuit of the pending goal. The success of this approach depends on the ability to predict which features are important to successful goal pursuit. For example, having your current ID along is a necessary precondition for accomplishing the goal, but it does not predict a particularly fortuitous time to resume pursuit. The more you can anticipate circumstances predictive of successful goal pursuit, the better you will be at noticing true opportunities when they occur.
EVIDENCE FOR PREDICTIVE ENCODING
In a series of studies, we investigated the predictive encoding model in the recognition of opportunities (Patalano, Seifert, & Hammond, 1993; Patalano & Seifert, 1997) . Our participants engaged in a commonsense planning task with multiple goals, and then were given a cued recall test of memory for the goals. Specifically, we tested the hypothesis that opportunities to achieve goals are more often recognized when previously anticipated during encoding. The method involved a planning scenario familiar to our college student participants:
Imagine you are visiting your friend, Chris, in her dormitory room. A neighbor summons Chris to attend a hall meeting, and she leaves you alone in her room. You decide to snoop around the room, and if you're careful to leave no signs, she'll never find out. Within this scenario, we presented a series of goals constrained by common objects; for example:
• You notice that Chris left her new college ring on her bureau. You try it on your finger and it gets stuck. You need to get the ring off before Chris returns.
• You jump on the bed. In the process, you manage to leave scuffmarks high up on the white wall next to the bed. You need to remove the scuffmarks before Chris returns.
• When you open the window to get some fresh air, a breeze blows her poster off the wall. You are not sure how it was attached to the wall, but you need to reattach it before Chris returns.
During an initial study phase, participants were told to read and make a mental note of each goal. In addition, we manipulated the type of preparation performed during goal encoding. One group of participants was asked to generate their own solution for each of the goals. In another group, participants were given an object with the goal, and were asked to generate their own plan; for example, for the "stuck ring" goal, they saw the cue, "You think that if only you had some Vaseline, you might be able to ___?" A third group was given both a plan and an object for each goal; for example, "You think that if only you had some Vaseline, you might be able to grease your finger and slide the ring off." These instructional manipulations were intended to create differences in how participants encoded the goals into memory.
Next, a recall test presented a series of cues, and the participants were asked to write down any of the studied goals that "came to mind." Each cue described a single everyday object (e.g., "The only thing you find under the sink is a jar of Vaseline. If you could use the Vaseline to achieve any of your goals, record it below"). For a given participant, the cue presented could "match" the plan and object they studied during encoding (e.g., "lubrication with Vaseline"), or present a novel opportunity for that goal (from an equally plausible plan, but not the one they had studied; e.g., "ice cubes" as a cue for the plan to "shrink your finger with cold ice"). In addition, each participant saw five filler cues that were less readily associated with any of the goals (e.g., "a comb," "tea bags," "a shoe"). The dependent measure thus consisted of the percentage of goals recalled from anticipated, unanticipated (but related), and unrelated cues.
As expected, more goals were recalled in response to anticipated cues. If "Vaseline" was studied with the goal of removing the stuck ring, more reports of the goal occurred given a "Vaseline" cue than given "ice cubes." Participants who prepared plans during goal encoding also produced fewer unrelated remindings (e.g., listing "stuck ring" under "shoe"). These findings suggest participants are more likely to recognize cues as related to pending goals if they predicted those specific cues during encoding. The benefits of preparation extended only to opportunities related to the prepared plan, and not to unanticipated (equally valid) plans. For cues they had not prepared, they performed about the same as participants who did no advance planning.
In other studies, we investigated the nature of planning at the time of encoding. Must you anticipate exactly the object later seen as a cue? We found that anticipating a plan also helped in recognizing novel (related) objects that also fit the plan; for example, having prepared the "lubrication with Vaseline" plan for the "stuck ring" goal, both the old "Vaseline" cue and a new "butter" cue facilitated recall. In sum, the advantages in retrieval observed were specific to the type of plan predicted, but not to the specific objects anticipated with each plan. These results support the hypothesis that predictive encoding of cue features can improve the likelihood of noticing later opportunities.
CONCLUSIONS
On the whole, these findings support the predictive encoding model, in which planning features are predicted at the time of goal postponement, indexed with the goal in memory, and later brought to mind by cues experienced in the environment. These results are consistent with studies demonstrating that event-based retrieval depends on episodic associations (McDaniel, Robinson-Riegler, & Einstein, 1998) . But further, these studies show that even novel objects can be recognized as related to pending goals if they fill the same functional role within an anticipated plan. While Tulving and Thomson (1973) noted that recall is facilitated by similarity between encoding and retrieval contexts, predictive encoding goes further to suggest that the planner must create associations in advance of their actual presence in the environment. It is the anticipation of ideal circumstances for goal satisfaction that allows us to retrieve pending goals opportunistically.
A further challenge for this theory is to explain exactly what constitutes a "predictive feature." What level of description is best for predicting opportunities within a domain? For example, with the "address change" goal, you might anticipate location, as in: "Next time I'm in the vicinity of the bureau, I'll change my address." However, this specific opportunity may not arise for some time. On the other hand, prepared features may be too general, such as, "Next time I have free time, I'll change my address." This feature may occur more often, but noticing it may be more difficult. Optimally, predicted features should 1) identify required circumstances for executing the plan; 2) occur in the external environment somewhat infrequently; and 3) be formulated to match observed features likely to attract your attention. For example, anticipating a "cancelled appointment" as just the circumstances needed for satisfying the "address change" goal would maximize your chance of recognizing this opportunity.
Useful feature descriptions may depend upon the regularity of features within a domain. With experience, a "planning vocabulary" of resources and constraints may be identified, leading to more optimal use of predictive features. While the present paradigm invokes a limited domain, it makes the case that planning knowledge plays a key role in our capacity for opportunism. We might expect individuals to vary in their success at recognizing opportunities, to improve with experience within a domain, and to be limited by the quality of their planning preparation (c.f. Einstein & McDaniel, 1990) . Predictive encoding is thus a metamemory process: It is voluntary, requires attention and processing capacity, and varies in success based on the quality of planning (c.f. Marsh, Hicks, & Landau, 1998) . And as Gollwitzer (1999) suggests, the implementation of actions may be largely directed by the retrieval of intentions based on events in the world.
Predictive encoding is an important phenomenon because it ties the intelligent pursuit of goals to one's advance preparation. However, in some environments, it is not possible stop and plan ahead while in the midst of other activities. In addition, predictive encoding may be costly when the effort expended in advance planning later proves unnecessary. For some less important goals, returning at a later time may not warrant the cost of preparation; for others, opportunities may be so readily available, or well learned, that predictive encoding is unnecessary. But in the appropriate circumstances, predictive encoding may represent a means of accomplishing intelligent planning within dynamic environments. Of course, despite our efforts to prepare for future opportunities, we will miss some; however, through predictive encoding, we will maximize the detection of those opportunities we expect are most likely to actually occur. And to the extent that our models of how to accomplish our goals in the world are accurate, chance encounters will favor our plans. 
